

## 1 **10.5 Decarbonization of aviation**

2 Aviation is widely recognized as a ‘hard-to-decarbonize’ sector (Sudhir Gota, Huizenga, Peet,  
3 Medimorec, & Bakker, 2019c) (Committee on Climate Change, 2019) having a high dependency on  
4 liquid fossil fuels and an operational and technology infrastructure that has long ‘lock-in’ timescales,  
5 resulting in slow fleet turnover times and long technology development timescales. Alternative lower-  
6 carbon footprint fuels have been certified for usage over recent years, principally from bio-feedstocks  
7 but are not yet widely available at economic prices yet (Kandaramath Hari, Yaakob, & Binitha, 2015).  
8 In addition, alternative fuels from bio-feedstocks have variable carbon footprints because of different  
9 life-cycle emissions associated with different production methods and associated land-use change (de  
10 Jong et al., 2017b) (Staples, Malina, Suresh, Hileman, & Barrett, 2018b) (Witcover, Yeh, & Sperling,  
11 2013) (Staples, Malina, & Barrett, 2017b) – see section 10.3.3. The complex options emerging will be  
12 reviewed.

### 13 **10.5.1 Historical and current emissions from aviation**

14 The principal greenhouse gas from aviation is CO<sub>2</sub>, although aviation has a number of other effects on  
15 climate through its non-CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (see section xx). Emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> are calculated under  
16 UNFCCC reporting requirements as being either domestic or international; however, a number of  
17 methodologies are used by states according to facilities and data availability such that the global data  
18 are less reliable for assessment purposes. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)  
19 emissions estimation uses more complex greenhouse gas emissions models (tier 3 models, IPCC,  
20 2006) and datasets of real aircraft movements, where available, and probably represents the best  
21 inventory available for spot years (e.g. 2006, 2013). However, ICAO focusses on international  
22 emissions and there are some known sources of underestimation. Historical data are required for  
23 assessment of CO<sub>2</sub> impacts and this has been estimated from International Energy Agency (IEA)  
24 statistics of aviation fuel (Jet-A1, AvGas) production and usage (Sausen & Schumann, 2000) (Lee et  
25 al., 2009) (Lee et al., 2020).

26 Domestic aviation emissions are attributable to states and are included under their NDCs towards the  
27 Paris Agreement goals, whereas international emissions are non-attributable to states (similar to  
28 international shipping emissions). International emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> from aviation are not specified  
29 under the Paris Agreement (unlike the Kyoto Protocol), however, the respective UN agencies of  
30 ICAO and the International Maritime Organization are still pursuing measures for limiting and  
31 reducing emissions of greenhouse gases.

32 In 2018, emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> from global aviation were just over 1 Gt of CO<sub>2</sub> and have been steadily  
33 increasing at rates of around 2.5% yr<sup>-1</sup> over the last two decades although the period 2010 to 2018 saw  
34 a sharper increase of +27% in total. International emissions of aviation are calculated by ICAO to be  
35 65% of global emissions and projected to increase both in absolute terms and as a relative proportion  
36 to total aviation (Fleming & Lepinay, 2019). Current (2018) total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from aviation  
37 represent approximately 2.4% of total anthropogenic emissions of CO<sub>2</sub>, including land use change, on  
38 an annual basis (using IEA data, IATA data and global emissions data, Le Quéré et al., 2018).

### 39 **10.5.2 Short lived climate forcers and aviation**

40 Aviation emits a number of gases and aerosol particles that contribute towards its total fraction of  
41 anthropogenic climate forcing of approximately 3%, from its historical emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> and other  
42 emissions of water vapour, particles from soot and sulphate (from S in the fuel), and nitrogen oxides  
43 (NO<sub>x</sub>, =NO + NO<sub>2</sub>), with its 2018 total being ~98 mW m<sup>-2</sup> (Lee et al., 2020). The non-CO<sub>2</sub> effects of  
44 aviation on climate fall into the category of short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs). Emissions of water  
45 vapour and soot particles can trigger the formation of contrails, if the atmosphere is supersaturated  
46 with respect to ice, and below a critical threshold temperature condition (Kärcher, 2018). These linear

1 contrails can spread to form extensive contrail cirrus cloud coverage, which is estimated to have a  
2 combined effective radiative forcing (ERF) of around  $50 \text{ mW m}^{-2}$  (Lee et al., 2020), some 51% of the  
3 current ERF of global aviation. Emissions of  $\text{NO}_x$  result in an enhancement of short-lived  $\text{O}_3$  (a  
4 positive ERF) and a reduction of ambient  $\text{CH}_4$ , which represents a negative ERF; the  $\text{CH}_4$  reduction  
5 also results in negative ERFs from reductions in stratospheric water vapour (Myhre et al., 2007) and  
6 background  $\text{O}_3$  (Holmes, Tang, & Prather, 2011), which together results in a net  $\text{NO}_x$  ERF of  $\sim 18 \text{ mW}$   
7  $\text{m}^{-2}$  (Lee et al., 2020).

8 Additional effects from aviation from aerosol-cloud interactions are thought to exist but the  
9 magnitude of these are highly uncertain, with no best estimates available. Soot emissions from  
10 aircraft, either deposited directly in the atmosphere or sublimed from contrail cirrus may increase  
11 cloudiness, and the forcing from this cloudiness may be strongly negative or positive, depending on  
12 critical atmospheric parameters (C. Zhou & Penner, 2014) (C. Zhou, Penner, Lin, Liu, & Wang,  
13 2016), or possibly closer to a zero net effect (Gettelman & Chen, 2013) (Pitari et al., 2015). Sulphur  
14 from the fuel is largely emitted as  $\text{SO}_2$  with a small fraction ( $\sim 3\%$ ) emitted as  $\text{H}_2\text{SO}_4$  (Petzold et al.,  
15 2005). The  $\text{SO}_2$  oxidises in the background atmosphere to form sulphate particles, and these particles  
16 are thought to contribute to the secondary indirect effect on warmer low-level liquid clouds, resulting  
17 in a net negative forcing of uncertain magnitude (Righi, Hendricks, & Sausen, 2013) (Kapadia et al.,  
18 2016).

19 The net warming from aviation's non- $\text{CO}_2$  SLCFs is  $\sim 64\%$  of aviation's total warming and as such is  
20 the subject of discussion for reducing its impacts. However, the issues are complex, potentially  
21 involving technological, operational and atmospheric trade-offs with  $\text{CO}_2$  (see section X). Moreover,  
22 the impacts of aviation  $\text{NO}_x$  emissions perturbing the chemical composition of the atmosphere are not  
23 independent of background emissions from surface sources (ozone precursor emissions of  $\text{NO}_x$ ,  $\text{CO}$ ,  
24  $\text{CH}_4$  and NMHCs) and need to be accounted for in assessing future changes in ERF and mitigation  
25 potential (Skowron et al., 2020).

### 26 **10.5.3 Mitigation potential of fuels, operations, energy efficiency and market-based** 27 **measures**

#### 28 **Technology options (engine/airframe)**

29 The principal GHG of importance from aviation is  $\text{CO}_2$ , emitted at a ratio of  $3.16 \text{ kg CO}_2$  for every kg  
30 of fuel combusted. Other emissions that impact on aviation's non- $\text{CO}_2$  effects on climate are water  
31 vapour, particles, and  $\text{NO}_x$  (10.5.1). Engine and airframe manufacturers primary objective after safety  
32 issues is to reduce direct operating costs, i.e. fuel burn so much investment has gone into engine  
33 technology and aerodynamics to improve fuel burn per km. there have been major step changes in  
34 engine technology over time, e.g. from early 'jet' (turbojet) engines, to larger turbofan engines, and  
35 second-generation turbofans. Airframes have had improved performance over the years with wing  
36 design and incorporation of 'winglets' on the wing-tips. However, the basic configuration of an  
37 aircraft has remained more or less the same for decades.

38 As a result of this continuous improvement, large incremental gains have become much harder as the  
39 technology has matured, although twin-aisle aircraft have seen greater improvement rates in their lift  
40 to drag ratio than those of single-aisle aircraft (Cumpsty et al., 2018). The principal opportunities for  
41 fuel reduction come from improvements in aerodynamic efficiency, aircraft mass reduction, and  
42 propulsion system improvements. In terms of the future, Cumpsty et al.'s (2018) comprehensive  
43 assessment suggested that the highest rate of fuel burn reduction achievable for new aircraft was about  
44  $1.3\%$  per year, which short of ICAO's aspirational goal of  $2\%$  global annual average fuel efficiency  
45 improvement. Hence, the case established in the technology assessment of the IPCC (1999) report on  
46 Aviation and the Global Atmosphere is that growth continues to greatly outpace emission reductions  
47 from improved efficiency, which is why alternative approaches have been sought to reduce aviation's

1 climate impact by, e.g. alternative lower-carbon fuels on a life cycle basis (next section). More radical  
2 solutions have been suggested to modify the current air traffic system, e.g. by ‘formation flying’ (Xu  
3 et al., 2014), which has the potential to reduce fuel burn by up to ~8%. However, this would require  
4 increased capability onboard safety systems for wake sensing (Hemati et al., 2014) and ground-based  
5 air traffic control.

### 6 **Operational improvements (navigation)**

7 Aircraft navigation, from a global perspective is relatively efficient, with many long-haul routes  
8 travelling along great circle trajectories, or as close to possible, avoiding headwinds that increase fuel  
9 consumption (e.g. the north Atlantic flight corridor). In more densely populated and trafficked  
10 regions, aviation is more constrained; often by military airspace, congestion or adverse weather (e.g.  
11 Europe, North America). Few independent assessments are available of the potential for operational  
12 improvements. The ICAO ‘trends assessment’ exercise (Fleming & Lepinay, 2019), projects global  
13 improvements introduced by operational improvements (air traffic management) by an unspecified  
14 amount by 2050<sup>1</sup>. In contrast, such projections have to be balanced against detailed assessments of the  
15 challenges of operating in more congested airspace: for example, EUROCONTROL (2018) projected  
16 in their ‘most likely’ growth scenario, ‘Regulation and Growth’, that the majority of en-route airspace  
17 will face an increase of demand over 2017 levels by between 50% and 80% by 2040.

### 18 **Fuels (alternative biofuels, synthetic fuels and liquid hydrogen)**

19 The development of bio-based ‘sustainable alternative fuels’ has been widely addressed in recent  
20 years as a ‘drop in’ alternative fuel to reduce aviation’s carbon footprint. This obviates difficulties  
21 over developing radical new or alternative technologies in terms of engines and airframes, which  
22 would still utilize fossil-based kerosene aviation fuel. The cost of replacing the 2012 global aviation  
23 fleet was estimated at a trillion dollars, taking at least 14 years highlighting the difficulties associated  
24 with fleet replacement for new technologies (Hileman and Stratton, 2014). Thus, alternative fuels that  
25 can be utilized with current technologies, is an attractive proposition for CO<sub>2</sub> mitigation. Alternative  
26 aviation fuels to fossil-based kerosene have to be certified to the same standard as Jet-A for a variety  
27 of parameters associated with safety issues. Currently, the American Society for Testing and Materials  
28 (ASTM International) has certified five different types of sustainable aviation fuels with maximum  
29 blends ranging from 50% to 10% (Chiaramonti, 2019).

30 Bio-based fuels can be created by a number of feedstocks including cultivated feedstock crops, crop  
31 residues, municipal solid waste, waste fats, oils and greases, wood products and forestry residues  
32 (Staples et al., 2018). Each of these different sources can have different associated life-cycle  
33 emissions, such that they are not net zero-CO<sub>2</sub> but have associated emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> or other GHGs  
34 from their production and distribution. There are many challenges and barriers to widespread  
35 development of sustainable alternative fuels (SAF), the primary one being the current cost of fossil  
36 fuel vs SAF production (SAF is currently around three times the price of kerosene, Hari et al., 2015),  
37 which is a constraint on commercial development and viability. Other factors include cost effective  
38 production, feedstock availability, and certification costs (Hari et al., 2015). In addition, associated  
39 land use change emissions can be as large, or larger than the other life cycle emissions, depending  
40 upon crop type and location and represent a constraint in biofuel mitigation potential (Staples et al.,  
41 2017) and have inherent large uncertainties (Plevin et al., 2009). Other sustainability issues include  
42 food vs fuel arguments, water resource usage, and impacts on biodiversity.

43 Nonetheless, bio-based SAFs have been estimated to achieve life-cycle emissions reductions ranging  
44 between approximately 2% and 70% under a wide range of scenarios (Staples et al., 2018). For a set  
45 of European aviation demand scenarios, Kousoulidou and Lonza (2016) estimated that the demand in

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<sup>1</sup> Estimated from their Figure 4 as a saving of approximately 7% fuel over a baseline, by 2050.

1 2030 would be ~100 Mtoe in 2030 and biokerosene (HERFA/HVO) penetration would be just over  
2 2% of the total fuel demand at that date.

3 Clearly, for bio-based SAFs to be economically competitive, large adjustments in prices of fossil fuels  
4 or introduction of policies are required. Staples et al. (2018) estimated that in order to introduce bio-  
5 based SAFS that reduced LCA emissions by >50% by 2050, prices and policies were necessary for  
6 incentivization and require 268 new biorefineries per years and capital investment of approximately  
7 22 to 88 billion US\$ (2015 prices) per year between 2020 and 2050.

8 Other pathways have been discussed for the production of SAFs such as power-to-liquid pathways  
9 (Schmidt et al., 2018), sometimes termed ‘electro-fuels’ (Goldmann et al., 2018), or more generalized  
10 power to ‘x’ pathways (Kober et al., 2019). This process would involve the utilization of renewable  
11 electricity, CO<sub>2</sub> and water to synthesize jet fuel. Hydrogen is produced via an electrochemical process,  
12 powered by renewable energy and combined with CO<sub>2</sub> captured directly from the atmosphere and  
13 combined either by the Fischer-Tropsch or methanol synthesis. In comparison to bio-SAF production,  
14 the process is in its infancy but in terms of environmental performance, assuming availability of  
15 renewable electricity, it has much smaller land and water requirements, and potential for large life  
16 cycle emission reductions (Schmidt et al., 2016). No trials have yet been achieved.

17 Liquid hydrogen (LH<sub>2</sub>) as a fuel has been discussed for aeronautical applications since the 1950s  
18 (Brewer, 1991) and a few experimental aircraft have flown using such a fuel. Although the fuel has an  
19 energy density ~3 times greater than kerosene, it has a much lower energy density per unit volume.  
20 Experimental small aircraft have also flown using hydrogen fuel cells. LH<sub>2</sub> is a viable fuel source for  
21 commercial civil aviation passenger aircraft albeit with altered airframe structures to accommodate  
22 the fuel in the fuselage (Klug and Faass, 2001). Bicer and Dincer (2017) found that LH<sub>2</sub>-powered  
23 aircraft compared favourably to conventional kerosene-powered aircraft on a life cycle analysis  
24 (LCA) basis, providing that the LH<sub>2</sub> was generated from renewable energy sources (0.014 kg CO<sub>2</sub>  
25 tonne km<sup>-1</sup> cf 1.03 kg CO<sub>2</sub> tonne km<sup>-1</sup>, unspecified passenger aircraft). However, Pereria et al. (2014)  
26 also made a LCA comparison, and found much smaller benefits of LH<sub>2</sub>-powered aircraft  
27 (manufactured from renewable energy) compared with conventional fossil-kerosene, the two studies  
28 exposing the sensitivities of boundaries and assumptions in the analyses. Harsha (2014) and  
29 Rondinelli et al. (2017) conclude that there are many infrastructural barriers but that the  
30 environmental benefits of renewably-sourced LH<sub>2</sub> would be considerable. Khandelwal et al. (2013)  
31 take a more optimistic view of the prospect of LH<sub>2</sub>-powered aircraft but envisage them within a  
32 hydrogen-oriented energy economy.

33 In conclusion, there are many favourable arguments for LH<sub>2</sub>-powered aircraft both on an efficiency  
34 basis (Verstraete, 2013) and an overall reduction in GHG emissions, even on an LCA basis, but the  
35 major constraint is the infrastructural issues associated with fuel storage and distribution at airports,  
36 which is unlikely to be overcome unless there was a more general move towards a hydrogen-based  
37 energy economy. This is a conclusion for most heavy vehicle systems and the hydrogen option.

### 38 **Technological and operational trade-offs of non-CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and effects with CO<sub>2</sub>**

39 Since aviation has significant non-CO<sub>2</sub> warming impacts, there has been some discussion as to  
40 whether these can be addressed by either technological or operational means. For example, as aircraft  
41 engines have improved their fuel efficiency, with widescale usage of large high overall pressure ratio  
42 engines with large bypass ratios from large fan-bladed engines, this has tended to increase pressures  
43 and temperatures at the combustor inlet, with a resultant increase in tendency for thermal NO<sub>x</sub>  
44 formation in the absence of combustor technology to reduce this. This represents a potential  
45 technology trade-off whereby NO<sub>x</sub> control may be at the expense of extra fuel efficiency. Estimating  
46 the benefits or disbenefits of fuel and therefore CO<sub>2</sub> vs NO<sub>x</sub> is complex (Freeman, Lee, Lim,  
47 Skowron, & De León, 2018), requiring climate/chemistry model calculations and usage of emissions-

1 equivalency metrics, such as the Global Warming Potential (GWP) or Global Temperature change  
2 Potential (GTP) (see (Dalsøren et al., 2013) for an overview). Any GWP/GTP type emissions  
3 equivalency calculation always involves the user selection of a time horizon, over which the  
4 calculation is made, which is a subjective choice (Fuglestvedt et al., 2010). In general, the longer the  
5 time horizon, the more important CO<sub>2</sub> becomes in comparison with a SCLF.

6 A widely discussed opportunity for aviation non-CO<sub>2</sub> mitigation is the avoidance of contrails.  
7 Contrails only form with the emission of water vapour and soot particles from aircraft into ice-  
8 supersaturated air below a critical temperature threshold (Kärcher, 2018). It is therefore feasible to  
9 alter flight trajectories to avoid such areas conducive to contrail formation, since these ‘moist lenses’  
10 tend to be 10s of km in the horizontal and only a few 100 metres in the vertical extent (Gierens,  
11 Schumann, Smit, Helten, & Zängl, 1997). Theoretical approaches in the literature show that  
12 avoidance is possible on a flight-by-flight basis (Matthes et al., 2017). In case studies, it has been  
13 demonstrated that flight planning according to *trajectories with minimal climate impact* can  
14 substantially (up to 50%) reduce the aircraft net climate impacts despite additional CO<sub>2</sub> emissions  
15 (e.g., (Niklaß et al., 2019)). However, such a conclusion of the net benefit or disbenefit depends upon  
16 the choice of metric and time-horizon applied. As for the above example of technological trade-offs,  
17 there is a tendency for additional CO<sub>2</sub> to cause a net disbenefit for all metrics when longer time  
18 horizons are considered.

#### 19 **Market-based measures – EU-ETS, other ETS, ICAO-CORSIA offsetting measure**

20 Market-based measures have been introduced in various regions of the world, based on emissions  
21 trading of CO<sub>2</sub>, notably in Europe but also for domestic aviation in New Zealand. The other major  
22 initiative is within ICAO, the ‘Carbon Offset and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation’  
23 (CORSIA), agreed in 2016 to commence in 2020.

24 The European Union (EU) introduced aviation into its CO<sub>2</sub> emissions trading scheme (ETS) in 2012.  
25 This initially included flights between the European Economic Area (EEA) states and non-EEA  
26 states. However, the extension of the scheme to non-EEA states was highly controversial and in 2014  
27 the EU deferred the inclusion these flights under the so-called ‘stop-the-clock’ derogation. Currently,  
28 the EU-ETS for aviation includes all flights within and to and from EEA states. At around the same  
29 time, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) proposed to develop a global offsetting  
30 scheme, which was agreed in 2016 to commence in 2020, the ‘Carbon Offset and Reduction Scheme  
31 for International Aviation’.

32 CORSIA has a phased implementation, with with an initial pilot phase (2021–2023) and a first phase  
33 (2024–2026) in which states will participate voluntarily. The second phase will then start (2026–  
34 2035) in which all states will participate unless exempted. States may be exempted if they have lower  
35 aviation activity levels or based on their UN development status. As of 16 July 2019, 81 States,  
36 representing ~77% of international aviation activity, intend to voluntarily participate in CORSIA from  
37 its outset. In terms of routes, only those where both States are participating are included. There is  
38 currently no “third phase” described and the fate of the CORSIA beyond 2035 is unclear.

39 The fate of the EU-ETS running concurrently with CORSIA is unclear at the moment. The EU-ETS is  
40 different to CORSIA in that the former is a cap-and-trade scheme, with airlines purchasing  
41 allowances, whereas CORSIA relies on verified offsetting, and exempts some biofuels. The nature of  
42 offsetting means that reductions are purchased from other sectors that either withhold from an  
43 intended emission, or reforest (Becken & Mackey, 2017), which is unclear that this represents a real  
44 reduction in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

#### 1 **10.5.4 Accountability and governance options**

2 Under Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I countries were called to “...*pursue limitation or*  
3 *reduction of emissions of GHGs not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine*  
4 *bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International*  
5 *Maritime Organization, respectively.*” The Paris Agreement is rather different, in that ICAO (and the  
6 IMO) are not named, so that international aviation emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> do not appear to be covered, in  
7 that the Paris Agreement deals with states, and their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).  
8 This would imply that domestic aviation emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> (currently 35% of the global total) are  
9 covered by NDCs but international emissions are not. A number of states and regions have declared  
10 their intentions to include international aviation in their net-zero commitments including the UK,  
11 France, Sweden, and Norway, with the intentions of the European Union, New Zealand, California  
12 and Denmark being as yet unclear but under consideration (Committee on Climate Change, 2019).  
13 The Paris Agreement is a temperature-based target, such that it is unclear how emissions of GHGs and  
14 other climate forcers that are not included, including those from international aviation would be  
15 accounted for. Clearly, this is a less than ideal situation for clarity of governance of international  
16 GHG emissions from both aviation and shipping.

17 The ICAO CORSIA is a part of ICAO’s aspirational ‘carbon-neutral growth goal, 2020’, such that  
18 through CORSIA and technological and operational improvements, ICAO aims that international  
19 aviation emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> should not grow above 2020 levels. In addition, ICAO has a goal of global  
20 annual average fuel efficiency improvements of 2 percent until 2020 and an aspirational global fuel  
21 efficiency improvement rate of 2 percent per annum from 2021 to 2050. ICAO also regulates  
22 emissions, including those of NO<sub>x</sub>, CO, hydrocarbons (HCs) and non-volatile particulate emissions  
23 (nvPM) from engines, and recently (2017) adopted a whole-aircraft emissions standard for CO<sub>2</sub>. The  
24 emissions regulations of NO<sub>x</sub>, HCs, CO and nvPM are primarily targeted at protecting air quality in  
25 and around airports. However, there has been a working assumption that reducing NO<sub>x</sub> will reduce its  
26 impacts on tropospheric O<sub>3</sub> formation and its subsequent radiative forcing. In addition, emissions of  
27 nvPM or ‘soot’ are part of the early process of contrail formation and reducing the emissions  
28 (number) will reduce the initial number of ice crystal particles in the plume at altitude and reduce the  
29 propensity for contrail and subsequent contrail cirrus formation (Kärcher, 2018).

30 More recently, ICAO has at its 40<sup>th</sup> General Assembly (October, 2019) requested ICAO’s Council to  
31 “...*continue to explore the feasibility of a long-term global aspirational goal for international aviation,*  
32 *through conducting detailed studies assessing the attainability and impacts of any goals proposed,*  
33 *including the impact on growth as well as costs in all countries, especially developing countries, for*  
34 *the progress of the work to be presented to the 41st Session of the ICAO Assembly*”. What form this  
35 goal will take is unclear until work is presented to the 41<sup>st</sup> Assembly (Autumn, 2022).

#### 36 **10.5.5 Synthesis: transformation trajectories for the aviation sector**

37 Here, three basic trajectories of development are envisaged that have differing degrees of response to  
38 reductions in GHG emissions. Some of the developments are encompassed by global or regional goals  
39 while some are more speculative.

40 A ‘**business as usual**’ (BAU) scenario largely reflects current and projected rates of technology  
41 development and policies currently in place. So, for aviation, global fleet fuel efficiency improves at  
42 around 1-2% per annum, with operational improvement delivering smaller improvements (since the  
43 system is relatively efficient). Market-based measures continue to operate through to at least 2030 in  
44 the case of the EU-ETS and 2035 in the case of CORSIA. Nonetheless, demand for aviation continues  
45 to increase at rates of somewhere between 5-7% yr<sup>-1</sup> in terms of RPK. Biofuel continues to make  
46 small contributions to aviation energy demand, of somewhere between 2 and 10% by 2050.



1 An ‘**incremental scenario**’ might be envisaged that sees technology developments similar to BAU,  
2 but with somewhat improved fuel efficiencies achieved from technology development with greater  
3 R&D development but a higher penetration of biofuels and zero-C synthetic fuels from renewables,  
4 resulting from greater private and governmental investment and the widening of ‘net-zero CO<sub>2</sub>  
5 ambitions’ by individual countries.

6 A ‘**transformational scenario**’ is one that works towards a target of net-zero CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from the  
7 aviation sector. This would be driven by active policies that mandated phase-out of fossil fuel usage  
8 by 2050, considerable private and governmental investment in technologies for zero-C synthetic fuels  
9 produced from widely deployed new fuel production facilities, powered by renewable energy as part  
10 of a wider system promotion and mandating of renewable energy sources, with decommissioning of  
11 the fossil-fuel energy supply system. Short haul aviation would also be potentially powered by all- or  
12 semi-electric powered propulsion systems. Bio-based lower carbon fuels are regarded as an integral  
13 part of such a scenario in the short to medium term, gradually being replaced by zero-C synthetic  
14 fuels from renewable resources. The cost of flying may become considerably higher and subsequent  
15 demand reduced over a BAU scenario. An alternative to widespread usage of zero-C paraffinic fuels  
16 which would equally fall under a transformative scenario is that of LH<sub>2</sub> as a fuel for aviation. This  
17 would equally require the H<sub>2</sub> to be generated from renewable energy sources. However, it could be  
18 likely that such widespread usage is less likely, as this would require complete fleet renewal and  
19 design of airframes and to a lesser degree, the engines, as current airframes could not be converted to  
20 take LH<sub>2</sub> fuel. Moreover, this would also require renewal of fuel supply infrastructure to airports.  
21 Even if the CO<sub>2</sub> impact could be made to be zero under this scenario, the non-CO<sub>2</sub> impacts remain  
22 poorly understood, since the emission index of water vapour would be much higher ( $\times 2.6$ , Ström and  
23 Gierens, 2002) than for conventional paraffinic fuels, and contrail and contrail cirrus formation may  
24 be of a greater incidence although with possibly lower optical thickness with estimates of RF ranging  
25 from  $\times 1.3$  to  $\times 0.7$  when compared with conventional contrail cirrus RF (Marquart et al., 2005).  
26 Potentially, NO<sub>x</sub> emissions would be lower, since combustion temperatures may be lower  
27 (Khandelwal et al., 2013).

## 28 **10.6 Decarbonization of shipping**

### 29 **10.6.1 Historical and current emissions from shipping**

30 Maritime transport volume has increased by 250% over the past 40 years, reaching all time high of 11  
31 billion tons of transported good in 2018 (UNCTAD, 2019). Shipping (international combined with  
32 domestic and fishing) emitted 938 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> in 2012, accounting for 2.6% of global anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub>  
33 emissions (3<sup>rd</sup> IMO GHG Study, Smith et al., 2014). International shipping alone accounted for 805  
34 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> in 2012. The estimated total emissions from maritime transport vary (Fig 10.15) depending  
35 on data set, and converge on 700 – 850 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> per year over the past decade, corresponding to 2-3%  
36 of total anthropogenic emissions, as found by Buhaug et al. (2009), Smith et al. (2014), Olmer et al.  
37 (2017), Johansson et al. (2017), DNV-GL (2019), the EDGAR data by Crippa et al. (2019), and the  
38 CAMS-GLOB-SHIP inventory by Jalkanen et al. (2014) and Granier et al. (2019). The emissions  
39 from international shipping are typically based on AIS data on ship traffic activity. There are a  
40 number of challenges in calculating emissions from the global fleet, explaining the range in the  
41 estimates in Figure 10.15. Such factors include coverage of AIS satellite data, especially further back  
42 in time, neglecting to account weather drag on vessels, in addition to hull fouling, as well as lack of  
43 information on vessels, such as technological specifications.

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